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If I have brought any message today, it is this: Have the courage to
have your wisdom regarded as stupidity . . . And have the courage to
suffer the contempt of the sophisticated world.
Justice Antonin Scalia
***
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court must be living in another world. Day by day, case by
case, it is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do not
recognize. 1
The answer to the question of whether the late Justice Antonin
Scalia is a friend or foe of criminal law and procedure is neither. Justice
Scalia was an intellectually honest jurist and the outcomes he reached
were based on the Constitution’s text and original meaning, not on
subjective values. 2
Scholars throughout the legal academy have overwhelmingly
criticized Justice Scalia for his stinging dissents in cases such as Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, United States v. Windsor, and Obergefell v.
1. Fr. Frank Pavone, A Country He Did Not Recognize: A Reflection On The Passing of
Justice Antonin Scalia, Brietbart, http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2016/03/03/a-countryhe-did-not-recognize-a-reflection-on-the-passing-of-justice-antonin-scalia/ (last visited Feb, 1,
2017).
2. See Adam Lamparello and Charles E. MacLean: It’s The People’s Constitution, Stupid:
Two Liberals Pay Tribute to Antonin Scalia’s Legacy, 45 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 281 (2014).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss2/3

2

Lamparello and MacLean: Originalism and the Criminal Law

2016]

ORIGINALISM AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

229

Hodges, where Justice Scalia chastised the majority for ignoring the
Constitution’s text to reach an outcome that the language of the
constitutional provision at issue—the Fourteenth Amendment—could
not possibly support. 3 In fact, some commentators have gone so far as to
describe Justice Scalia as racist, bigoted, and homophobic, primarily
because they disagree strongly with the outcomes that Scalia reached in
these and other cases. 4 For these scholars, the interpretive theory on
which Justice Scalia relied—originalism—is vacuous in theory and in
application and is designed to provide Justice Scalia’s conservative
policy agenda with the thin veneer of legitimacy. 5 Perhaps the lack of
conservative professors on most law faculties is contributing to such
largely unchallenged groupthink, the essence of which embraces an
ends-justifies-the-means approach in which the desirability of an
outcome justifies manipulating, even ignoring, the Constitution’s text. 6
As discussed in this article, such scholars view the courts, not the
legislature or democratic process, as the forum within which to achieve
substantive policy changes. Simply put, if the Court’s outcome does not
accord with their policy predilections, then the Justices in the majority—
and the interpretive theory upon which they rely—must be flawed. The
reality is that it is the other way around. Those who are focused on
outcomes and willing to do anything to achieve them embrace an
approach to constitutional interpretation that is flawed in theory, fatal in
fact, and undemocratic at its core. The authors are by no means
conservative, but we know that we have no monopoly on truth, and no
authority to define what is ‘right’ for everyone. Make no mistake: we do
not agree with the outcomes Justice Scalia reached in many cases, but
we respect the process by which he reached those outcomes.

3. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2012); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §
1 (providing in relevant part that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws”).
4. See, e.g., Barney Frank, Justice Scalia Is A Homophobe, Politico, (June 26, 2015),
available at: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/justice-scalia-gay-marriage-ruling119480; Bridget Todd, Tell Justice Scalia: Apologize For Your Racist Comments About The
Fourteenth Amendment, available at: https://www.credomobilize.com/petitions/tell-antonin-scaliaapologize-for-your-foul-remarks-on-race
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83 (2010).
6. See Tax Prof Blog, Why Are There So Few Conservative/Libertarian Law Profs, Even
Though They Are More Productive Scholars Than Liberal Law Profs? (May 16, 2016), available at:
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2016/05/why-are-there-so-few-conservativelibertarian-lawprofs-even-though-they-are-more-productive-scholars-than-liberal-law-profs.html.
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Let’s face it: an outcome-driven model of constitutional
interpretation results in decisions that are based upon little more than a
bare majority of the Justices’ subjective policy preferences. As discussed
below, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court, after conceding that the
Constitution did not support the outcome it reached, invented
constitutional “penumbras” to invalidate a ban on contraception and to
form the basis for creating additional unenumerated rights in the future. 7
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood, the Court, by a 5-4 margin, reaffirmed Roe v. Wade based on a previously undiscovered right “to
define one’s own concept of existence . . . and the mystery of human
life.” 8 Of course, none of these “rights” can be found anywhere in the
Constitution. They can be found, however, in transcendent dimensions
of dishonesty, hidden under the fragile but transparent veneer of flowery
rhetoric disguised as constitutional legitimacy.
Yet, critics of Justice Scalia, who criticize originalism yet
countenance outright distortions of the Constitution’s text, celebrate
these decisions, along with the constitutionally indefensible doctrine of
substantive due process and the laughable interpretive theory known as
“living constitutionalism,” which states that constitutional meaning
changes based on contemporary norms and thus countenances primarily
moral readings of the Constitution. 9 In other words, the Constitution’s
meaning changes to achieve the political will of a bare majority of the
Justices. This might be acceptable if it occurred in a kangaroo court, but
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851.
9. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Sutton, The Role of History in Judging Disputes About the Meaning
of the Constitution, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173, 1180 (2009). Judge Sutton states as follows:
One of the great debates in American legal history is whether judicial alterations of the
Constitution in the face of the exigencies of the moment represent a good or a bad
thing—or indeed whether certain landmark decisions changed the meaning of the
Constitution. Yet good or bad, a changeable Constitution, all can agree, presents risks—
risks of putting a singular power, a Framer’s pen, in the hands of five sitting Justices.
One school of thought, perhaps seeing what has happened over the last 200 years,
chooses to recognize the undeniable—that the meaning of the Constitution has
changed—and opts to embrace it. Of course the meaning of the Constitution changes,
they say, and of course it will be a majority of the Supreme Court who decides when it
changes. The Constitution, after all, was a blue print of government, not a Napoleonic
legal code, and its “majestic generalities” were meant to adapt to and be adaptable for
different ages, different circumstances, even different world views.48 Sized up in this
way, the U.S. Constitution is a living document, not a dead one; it changes with each
generation, permitting constructions of the document in one era to be discarded in the
next; and it is fanciful to think otherwise. These are the “living constitutionalists”:
Words, they say, require flexible interpretation, and there is nothing wrong with the
meaning of words changing over time, especially where that change reflects a shift in
public consensus about an issue.
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not in the United States Supreme Court. Of course, what such “theories”
really countenance is an approach to judicial decision-making in which
judges arrive at whatever result they deem most desirable and conceal
their subjectivity under a rhetorical gloss that masquerades as legal
reasoning. After all, under what provision in the Constitution can one
reasonably infer that the “right” to “liberty” under the Fourteenth
Amendment encompasses “the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life,” or that an asserted rights claim can implicate liberty “in its spatial
and more transcendent dimensions”? 10 Then again, why should the
Constitution matter when the Justices have life-tenure and, as cases such
as Griswold and Roe suggest, not even the pretense of accountability?
Well, because these approaches undermine democracy, the rule of law,
the Court’s institutional legitimacy, and give the few the right to decide
what is within the province of the people.
Of course, these decisions are anything but legitimate, and the
consistent decline in the Court’s popularity, coupled with the increased
politicization of the judiciary, which has transformed the judicial
nomination process into a modern-day soap opera, underscores this
fact. 11 Yet, many scholars and commentators continue to celebrate this
nonsense—and vilify Justice Scalia—while refusing to admit what any
reasonable jurist already knows: living constitutionalism is a sham and a
threat to the bedrock principles of democracy, including separation of
powers, federalism, de-centralization, and bottom-up lawmaking. On the
other hand, Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence (and originalism itself) does
not produce intellectually dishonest, outcome-based, value-driven, and
politically-motivated decisions.
This article will focus on Justice Scalia’s originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation in the context of criminal law and
procedure. An examination of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence
demonstrates that, more often than not, he agrees with that proposition
and has reached outcomes that are entirely at odds with his conservative
policy predilections, that benefit criminal defendants, flag burners, and
arrestees, and that faithfully apply the Constitution’s text. 12 For example,

10. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
11. See NBC News, Replacing Scalia: A Look Back At Some of the Rockiest Supreme Court
Nominations, available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/after-death-justicescalia-look-back-5-rockiest-supreme-court-n519731.
12. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), infra notes 177-78; see also U.S. v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400 (2012), infra notes 51-56; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), infra
notes 105-114.
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Justice Scalia’s opinions in cases involving the Confrontation Clause
and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments strengthened constitutional
protections for criminal defendants (and arrestees) and were consistent
with the Constitution’s text and underlying purposes. 13 Justice Scalia’s
opinions illustrate that it is possible to reach desirable outcomes through
an intellectually honest decision-making process, and that originalism is
a legitimate vehicle by which to achieve both objectives. The same
cannot be said for the Roe, Griswold, and Obergefell majorities. As
Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe—a liberal-leaning constitutional
law scholar—said when discussing Roe, “[o]ne of the most curious
things about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the
substantive judgment on which it rests is nowhere to be found.” 14 That
fact should trouble citizens of all political persuasions.
In the area of criminal law and procedure, Justice Scalia’s
jurisprudence demonstrates that he correctly rejects “living
constitutionalism,” which enables judges “to roam where unguided
speculation might take them,” and results in decisions that only Anthony
Kennedy, who invented a right to “equal dignity” under the law, would
support. 15 At bottom, the text is there for a reason—to safeguard against
the abuse of judicial power and, concomitantly, the usurpation of the
democratic process. After all, one judge’s view of justice may be
another’s prescription for injustice, just as one man’s terrorist is another
man’s freedom fighter. Justice Scalia’s approach to constitutional
interpretation is a testament to the fact that the Court’s “reasoned
judgment” in the “heady days of the here and now” has led to
indefensible outcomes that have undermined the Supreme Court’s
legitimacy, American constitutionalism, participatory democracy, and
the rule of law.16 Originalism has proven to be the most objective and
neutral interpretive theory. Its application by Justice Scalia in the face of
constant criticism and vilification should be viewed as a great feat that
has advanced American jurisprudence. Thus, scholars and commentators
who chastise Justice Scalia should first look in the mirror—they might
discover that they embody precisely what they condemn.
This article will analyze the utility of originalist constitutional
interpretation as well as some of the most influential opinions of which
13. Id.
14. Laurence Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1973); see also John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973).
15. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765 (1997).
16. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2623 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia was a part. Part II will discuss Justice Scalia’s originalist
approach in contrast to the “living constitution” approach. Part III will
analyze how Justice Scalia’s devotion to originalism benefited criminal
law. Part IV will discuss the legacy that Justice Scalia has left in his
body of case law and how it has and will continue to positively impact
the law as a whole.
II. ORIGINALISM—NOT LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM—IS THE
ENDURING THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Sometimes people come up to me and inquire, “Justice Scalia,
when did you first become an originalist?” As though it’s some weird
affliction, you know, “When did you start eating human flesh?” 17
Many scholars have criticized Justice Scalia’s originalism over the
years, but the reason for such criticism is as meritless as the arguments
supporting living constitutionalism. 18 Those who have levied such
criticisms against Justice Scalia often cite originalism as interpretive
theory upon which Justice Scalia relies to reach pre-ordained outcomes
that are consistent with his conservative “right-wing” agenda. 19 Yet,
upon closer analysis, nothing could be further from the truth. Justice
Scalia has regularly arrived at outcomes that are often contrary to his
political and ideological values, and Scalia has done so by focusing on
the process by which decisions are made, not upon the outcomes that he
thinks should be reached. In other words, Justice Scalia believes that,
although the Court has the power to say what the law is, it does not have
the power to say what the law should be. 20 Unfortunately, and as
17. Charlie Spiering, 31 Of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s Greatest Quotes (Feb.
13, 2016), Breitbart, available at: http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2016/02/13/superemecourt-justice-antonin-scalias-greatest-quotes/.
18. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, New Republic, (Aug. 24,
2012), available at: https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textualoriginalism
19. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say
What The Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 222 (1994) (“the presumption should be that the power ’to say
what the law is’ is not authoritatively vested in a single body with final, unreviewable authority to
decide all issues for all time”).
20. See, e.g., Jack Rakove, Joe The Ploughman Reads The Constitution, Or, The Poverty of
Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 578 (2011). Professor Rakove states as
follows:
[O]riginalism is the theory of constitutional interpretation that says that the meaning of a
constitutional text or provision is locked into it at the moment of adoption, and the
proper goal of constitutional interpretation is to ascertain and apply that meaning to the
case at hand. In a republic in which the adoption of a constitutional text depends directly
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discussed below, the same cannot be said for other members of the
Supreme Court, such as Justice Anthony Kennedy, who consciously
manipulate or ignore the Constitution’s text to reach outcomes
predicated primarily, if not exclusively, on their subjective policy
predilections.
By way of background, originalism, which rightfully remains a
dominant theory in constitutional interpretation (thanks to Justice
Scalia), is neither complex nor controversial. The basic premise is that
the Court should ascribe meaning to the Constitution’s text that is
consistent with its commonly understood meaning at the time the
Constitution was adopted. 21 Originalism has many variants, and some
scholars have embraced a less stringent version of originalism, arguing
that the Court should arrive at a reasonable meaning of the text based on
either an original or contemporary understanding of the words. 22 Under
this view, the basic premise is the same: the Court should not ascribe
meaning to the Constitution’s text that its words cannot reasonably
bear. 23 Implicit in this approach is the notion of honesty in decisionmaking; the Court should not manipulate or ignore the Constitution’s
text to achieve pre-determined outcomes, no matter how desirable.
Doing so gives the Court nearly unbridled authority to invent “rights” in
the future, removes the constraints on its Article III reviewing authority,
and undermines the fundamental precepts upon which a democratic
republic is predicated: federalism, separation of powers, decentralization, and bottom-up lawmaking.
Yet, many commentators have criticized originalism, not primarily
because of its theoretical underpinnings, but because they dislike the

on the authority of the people, knowing how a text was understood by both ordinary
citizens and their elected delegates and legislators matters more than the original
intentions of its authors.
21. See, e.g., Mitchell Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009).
Professor Berman states as follows:
Probably the most immediately recognizable originalist thesis holds that, whatever may
be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive inquiry (framers’ intent, ratifiers’
understanding, or public meaning), that object should be the sole interpretive target or
touchstone. Call this subtype of strong originalism “exclusive originalism.” It can be
distinguished from a sibling view that is a shade less strong—viz., that interpreters must
accord original meaning (or intent or understanding) lexical priority when interpreting
the Constitution but may search for other forms of meaning (contemporary meaning, best
meaning, etc.) when the original meaning cannot be ascertained with sufficient
confidence. Call this marginally more modest variant of strong originalism “lexical
originalism.”
22. See id.
23. See id.
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outcomes that it produces in some cases. 24 Interestingly, though, those
(including some Justices) who argue that Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence
is outcome-driven (as discussed below, it is not) and who embrace
“living constitutionalism,” which states that the Constitution’s meaning
changes over time based on contemporary values, 25 are the ones whose
approach to constitutional interpretation is outcome-focused and agendadriven. For example, consider the Fourteenth Amendment, which states
in relevant part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 26

A reasonable interpretation of this language suggests that states
cannot impose the death penalty, imprisonment, or forfeiture penalties
on any citizens unless there are adequate procedures to prevent arbitrary
and unfair punishments.
However, some Justices on the Court, often by bare 5-4 majorities,
along with commentators who embrace “living constitutionalism,” have
manipulated or entirely disregarded this language to infer (and therefore
invent) substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 For
example, in Roe v. Wade, the majority relied on an unenumerated “right”
to privacy that the Court inferred from the Fourteenth Amendment,
despite the fact that the Amendment’s language could not possibly
support such an interpretation. 28 In Planned Parenthood, the Court, per
Justice Kennedy, re-affirmed Roe based on a previously undiscovered
“right” “to define one’s own concept of existence. . . and the mystery of
human life.” 29 Justice Kennedy did so despite conceding that a literal
reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures
by which a State may deprive persons of liberty. 30 Well, it does suggest
that.
Likewise, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held that a statewide
ban on sodomy among same-sex couples violated the judicially-created
right to “liberty both in its spatial and in its more transcendent
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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dimensions” (not in any dimension of the Constitution). 31 In Obergefell,
a so-called “right” to “equal dignity” (not equal protection) under the
law supported recognition of a right to same-sex marriage. 32 No credible
jurist could claim that the Fourteenth Amendment’s words support such
outlandish interpretations—and none do. That may be why the Court felt
the need to discover invisible constitutional “penumbras” in Griswold,
invent a right to define “the mysteries of human life” in Planned
Parenthood, and in Lawrence countenance a transcendent right to
liberty. What is more, and what is profoundly interesting, is that in each
of these cases, the Justices in the majority reached outcomes that,
strangely, coincided with their personal views. 33 That is, well,
interesting.
To make matters worse, in these cases the Court’s decisions were
predicated on blatant distortions and manipulations of the Constitution’s
text, gave the Court nearly unfettered authority to invent unenumerated
“rights” in future cases, replaced de-centralization with centralization,
concentrated rather than separated federal power, and undermined
citizens’ ability to truly participate in democracy. 34 Put simply, the very
scholars who criticize Justice Scalia as an outcome-focused, agendadriven conservative should first look in the mirror and realize that
they—not Justice Scalia—embody precisely what they criticize. That
underscores the problem with “living constitutionalism” and outcomefocused decision-making: it is fundamentally dishonest and results in the
perception that judges decide cases based on subjective values, not
constitutional imperatives. It also lends credence to the words of former
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who stated that, “[a]t the constitutional
level where we work, 90 percent of any decision is emotional. The
rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilection.”35

31. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
32. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2675 (2012).
33. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116-67; see also Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851, 846;
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
34. See, e.g., Martin Edelman, Written Constitutions, Democracy, & Judicial Interpretation:
The Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism, 68 ALB. L. REV. 585, 594 (2005).
At the turn of the twentieth century, James Bradley Thayer helped to shift the terms of
the debate to judicial activism versus judicial self-restraint Thayer saw democracy
operating solely through the elected agencies of government. Therefore, when the nonelected judiciary failed to defer to the policy choices of those agencies—failed to restrain
their use of judicial review to negate those policies—the judges were thwarting the
workings of democracy. As Justice Felix Frankfurter later wrote: “In the day-to-day
working of our democracy it is vital that the power of the non-democratic organ of our
Government be exercised with rigorous self-restraint.”
35. See Melvin Urofsky, William O. Douglas As a Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133,
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That comment should trouble citizens of all political persuasions.
In any event, the best way to test whether Justice Scalia was an
outcome-focused jurist who manipulated the Constitution to advance his
ideological predilections is to analyze his jurisprudence. Before doing
so, however, Justice Scalia’s background—particularly his political and
ideological values—must be accurately categorized. By most accounts,
Scalia, who was appointed to the Court by President Ronald Reagan,
embraced conservatism and traditional moral values, was a devout
Roman Catholic, and advocated for interpreting the Constitution based
on its original meaning. 36 Scalia’s decisions, however, were arguably
contrary to these values equally as much as they were consistent with
them.
In fact, as the discussion below demonstrates, Justice Scalia
frequently arrived at outcomes that were directly at odds with his
political values and were produced through reasoning that maintained
fidelity to the Constitution and remained mindful of the Court’s role in
American democracy. The same cannot be said of the majority in
Griswold, Roe, Planned Parenthood, Lawrence, and Obergefell, where
the Court’s outcomes were a matter of political convenience rather than
constitutional conviction, and where the rule of law was trumped by the
rule of oligarchs.
III. JUSTICE SCALIA’S ORIGINALISM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW—AND CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Given Justice Scalia’s background as a conservative thinker who
embraced traditional Judeao-Christian moral values, one would think
that his decisions in the criminal law context would be pro-law
enforcement and anti-criminal defendant. 37 However, upon closer
examination, the opposite is true—Justice Scalia’s decisions often
safeguarded privacy rights against law enforcement’s investigatory
practices and resulted in enhanced protections at trial for criminal
defendants. 38

137-38 (1991) (quoting WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS at 3 (1980)).
36. Antonin Scalia, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/justices/antonin_scalia (last visited Feb 8,
2017).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibos, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The
Triumph of Justice Scalia, The Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants? 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005).
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A. Justice Scalia’s Originalism in The Fourth Amendment Context
In the Fourth Amendment context, Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence
has repeatedly re-affirmed the original purposes of the Fourth
Amendment and led to decisions that benefitted criminal defendants and
limited law enforcement’s authority.
1. Kyllo v. United States: What Constitutes a Search of a Home
In Kyllo, writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Scalia held that
the use of sense-enhancing technology to gather any information
concerning the interior of a residence, if the information could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area, constitutes a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment and therefore requires probable cause and a warrant (absent
a recognized exception to the warrant requirement).39 In addition, Justice
Scalia held that the use of thermal imaging to measure heat emanating
from a home also constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 40
In support of this holding, Justice Scalia emphasized that, “‘[a]t the
very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.’” 41 Accordingly, “[w]ith few exceptions, the question whether
a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional
must be answered no.” 42 Justice Scalia conceded that the “permissibility
of ordinary visual surveillance of a home used to be clear because, well
into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to
common-law trespass,” and “[v]isual surveillance was unquestionably
lawful because ‘the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a
trespass.’” 43 However, Justice Scalia recognized that technological
advances posed threats to privacy in a manner that did not previously
exist. As Justice Scalia noted, “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the
degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology,” as technology
“enabling human flight has exposed to public view. . . uncovered
portions of the house and its curtilage that once were private.” 44
Furthermore, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that thermal
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001).
See id.
See id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 33-34.
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imaging was reasonable because it did not “detect private activities
occurring in private areas,” 45 stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s
protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality
or quantity of information obtained.” 46 Rather, prior cases “made clear
that any physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a
fraction of an inch,’ was too much, and there is certainly no exception to
the warrant requirement for the officer who barely cracks open the front
door and sees nothing but the nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor.” 47
Indeed, in the home, “our cases show, all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.” 48
In so holding, Justice Scalia emphasized that the decision was
grounded in the Fourth Amendment’s original purposes:
We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws “a firm line at the
entrance to the house.” That line, we think, must be not only firm but
also bright—which requires clear specification of those methods of
surveillance that require a warrant. While it is certainly possible to
conclude from the videotape of the thermal imaging that occurred in
this case that no “significant” compromise of the homeowner’s privacy
has occurred, we must take the long view, from the original meaning
of the Fourth Amendment forward. 49

For these reasons, when “the Government uses a device that is not
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.” 50
2. United States v. Jones: What Constitutes a Search of Property
In Jones, the Court, per Justice Scalia, held that the use of a GPS
tracking device to monitor a suspect’s movements on a public highway
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 51 Scalia stated that:
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted . . . is a “case we have
described as a ‘monument of English freedom’ ‘undoubtedly familiar’
to ‘every American statesman’ at the time the Constitution was
adopted, and considered to be ’the true and ultimate expression of
constitutional law’” with regard to search and seizure. 52

Scalia also explained that “[t]he text of the Fourth Amendment
reflects its close connection to property, because otherwise it would have
referred simply to ‘the right of the people to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures’; the phrase ‘in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects’ would have been superfluous.” 53
In support of this holding, Justice Scalia connected Fourth
Amendment violations to both property and common-law trespass,
holding that “our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to
common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.” 54
In recent decades, the Court, applying Katz v. United States, had focused
on the issue of whether an alleged search was subjectively and
objectively reasonable.55 However, Justice Scalia refused to endorse the
Katz rationale exclusively, asserting that the approach was consistent
with the original purposes underlying the Fourth Amendment:
The concurrence begins by accusing us of applying “18th-century tort
law.” That is a distortion. What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee
against unreasonable searches, which we believe must provide at a
minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted.
The concurrence does not share that belief. It would apply exclusively
Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, even when that
eliminates rights that previously existed. 56

52. Id. at 404-05 (internal citations omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 406; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967) (holding that a
warrantless search is unlawful if it violates a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
56. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411-13. Justice Scalia also refused to rely solely on Katz when
assessing the constitutionality of searches under the Fourth Amendment:
In fact, it is the concurrence’s insistence on the exclusivity of the Katz test that
needlessly leads us into “particularly vexing problems” in the present case. This Court
has to date not deviated from the understanding that mere visual observation does not
constitute a search. We accordingly held in Knotts that “[a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.” Thus, even assuming that the concurrence is
correct to say that “[t]raditional surveillance” of Jones for a 4–week period “would have
required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” our
cases suggest that such visual observation is constitutionally permissible. It may be that
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3. Maryland v. King: Invasion of Privacy Through a Buccal Swab
“Search”
In Maryland v. King, the Court held that the use of a buccal swab to
obtain a defendant’s DNA sample after arrest was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. 57 Justice Scalia vigorously dissented, emphasizing
that this practice constituted a severe—and unconstitutional—invasion
of a defendant’s privacy. Scalia stated as follows:
At the time of the Founding, Americans despised the British use of socalled “general warrants”—warrants not grounded upon a sworn oath
of a specific infraction by a particular individual, and thus not limited
in scope and application. The first Virginia Constitution declared that
“general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed,” or to search a person “whose offence is not particularly
described and supported by evidence,” “are grievous and oppressive,
and ought not be granted.” 58

Justice Scalia also argued that the decision was inconsistent with

achieving the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass,
is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to
answer that question. And answering it affirmatively leads us needlessly into additional
thorny problems. The concurrence posits that “relatively short-term monitoring of a
person’s movements on public streets” is okay, but that “the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses” is no good. (emphasis added). That
introduces yet another novelty into our jurisprudence. There is no precedent for the
proposition that whether a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being
investigated. And even accepting that novelty, it remains unexplained why a 4–week
investigation is “surely” too long and why a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving
substantial amounts of cash and narcotics is not an “extraordinary offens[e]” which may
permit longer observation. What of a 2–day monitoring of a suspected purveyor of stolen
electronics? Or of a 6–month monitoring of a suspected terrorist? We may have to
grapple with these “vexing problems” in some future case where a classic trespassory
search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for
rushing forward to resolve them here. (internal citations omitted).
57. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1964-965 (2013).
58. Id. at 1980-81. Justice Scalia further stated:
Madison’s draft of what became the Fourth Amendment answered these charges by
providing that the “rights of the people to be secured in their persons . . . from all
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without
probable cause . . . or not particularly describing the places to be searched.” As ratified,
the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause forbids a warrant to “issue” except “upon
probable cause,” and requires that it be “particula[r]” (which is to say, individualized) to
“the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” And we have held that,
even when a warrant is not constitutionally necessary, the Fourth Amendment’s general
prohibition of “unreasonable” searches imports the same requirement of individualized
suspicion. (internal citations omitted).
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the Court’s precedent, which had only allowed suspicionless searches to
serve the special, not general, needs of law enforcement. 59 Noting that
“[a]lthough there is a ‘closely guarded category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches,’ Justice Scalia explained that this
never included searches designed to serve ‘the normal need for law
enforcement.’” 60 Indeed, “[e]ven the common name for suspicionless
searches—’special needs’ searches—itself reflects that they must be
justified, always, by concerns ‘other than crime detection.’” 61 As Justice
Scalia explained, the Court previously “approved random drug tests of
railroad employees . . . but only because the Government’s need to
‘regulat[e] the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety’ is distinct
from ‘normal law enforcement.’” 62 In addition, the Court has “approved
suspicionless searches in public schools—but only because there the
government acts in furtherance of its ‘responsibilities . . . as guardian
and tutor of children entrusted to its care.’” 63
Moreover, although Justice Scalia conceded that “the Court is
correct to note that there are instances in which we have permitted
searches without individualized suspicion,” he noted that “[i]n none of
these cases . . . did we indicate approval of a [search] whose primary
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” 64
Scalia stated as follows:
The Court hastens to clarify that it does not mean to approve invasive
surgery on arrestees or warrantless searches of their homes. That the
Court feels the need to disclaim these consequences is as damning a
criticism of its suspicionless-search regime as any I can muster. And
the Court’s attempt to distinguish those hypothetical searches from this
real one is unconvincing. We are told that the “privacy-related
concerns” in the search of a home “are weighty enough that the search
may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of
privacy of the arrestee.” But why are the “privacy-related concerns”
not also “weighty” when an intrusion into the body is at stake? (The
Fourth Amendment lists “persons” first among the entities protected
against unreasonable searches and seizures.) And could the police
engage, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, in a “brief and . . .
minimal” intrusion into the home of an arrestee—perhaps just peeking

59.
60.
(1989)).
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 1981 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1981-82.
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around the curtilage a bit? Obviously not. 65

Notwithstanding, Justice Scalia noted that “this discussion is beside the
point,” because “[n]o matter the degree of invasiveness, suspicionless
searches are never allowed if their principal end is ordinary crimesolving.” 66
For these reasons, Justice Scalia concluded that the Founders would
have likely found the search at issue contrary to the original purpose of
the Fourth Amendment:
Today’s judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of solving
more crimes; then again, so would the taking of DNA samples from
anyone who flies on an airplane (surely the Transportation Security
Administration needs to know the “identity” of the flying public),
applies for a driver’s license, or attends a public school. Perhaps the
construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the
proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so
eager to open their mouths for royal inspection. 67

Thus, “[s]olving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but it
occupies a lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives
than the protection of our people from suspicionless law-enforcement
searches.” 68
4. Navarette v. California: Reasonable Suspicion in Relation to an
Anonymous Tip
In Navarette, the Court held that an anonymous tip from a 911
caller reporting that a vehicle had driven the caller off the road was
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion and therefore justify a stop of
the vehicle. 69 In support of this holding, the majority, per Justice
Thomas, stated that the call “bore adequate indicia of reliability for the

65. Id. at 1982. (internal citations omitted).
66. Id. Justice Scalia also noted:
DNA testing does not even begin until after arraignment and bail decisions are already
made. The samples sit in storage for months, and take weeks to test. When they are
tested, they are checked against the Unsolved Crimes Collection—rather than the
Convict and Arrestee Collection, which could be used to identify them. The Act forbids
the Court’s purpose (identification), but prescribes as its purpose what our suspicionlesssearch cases forbid (“official investigation into a crime”). Against all of that, it is safe to
say that if the Court’s identification theory is not wrong, there is no such thing as error.
Id. at 1986.
67. Id. at 1989.
68. Id.
69. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1685 (2014).
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officer to credit the caller’s account.” 70 Specifically, “[b]y reporting that
she [the caller] had been run off the road by a specific vehicle—a silver
Ford F–150 pickup, license plate 8D94925—the caller necessarily
claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving,” and
“[t]hat basis of knowledge lends significant support to the tip’s
reliability.” 71 Justice Thomas also explained there was “reason to think
that the 911 caller in this case was telling the truth,” because the caller
reported the incident shortly after it had occurred. 72 As Justice Thomas
explained, “we generally credit the proposition that statements about an
event and made soon after perceiving that event are especially
trustworthy because ‘substantial contemporaneity of event and statement
negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.’” 73
Furthermore, the caller reported an incident that suggested the driver
was engaged in criminal activity:
The 911 caller in this case reported more than a minor traffic infraction
and more than a conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless driving.
Instead, she alleged a specific and dangerous result of the driver’s
conduct: running another car off the highway. That conduct bears too
great a resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations of drunk driving to
be dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness. Running another
vehicle off the road suggests lane-positioning problems, decreased
vigilance, impaired judgment, or some combination of those
recognized drunk driving cues. 74

For these reasons, the Court found “the indicia of reliability . . .
sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that the driver
of the reported vehicle had run another vehicle off the road.” 75
Justice Scalia wrote a blistering dissent, arguing that an anonymous
911 call, which merely reported an alleged traffic violation, is plainly
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that the driver was engaged
in criminal activity:
The Court’s opinion serves up a freedom-destroying cocktail
consisting of two parts patent falsity: (1) that anonymous 911 reports
of traffic violations are reliable so long as they correctly identify a car
and its location, and (2) that a single instance of careless or reckless
70.
71.
72.
73.
371).
74.
75.

Id. at 1688.
Id. at 1689.
Id.
Id. (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes on FED. RULE EVID. 803(1), 28 U.S.C. App., p.
Id. at 1691.
Id. at 1692.
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driving necessarily supports a reasonable suspicion of drunkenness. All
the malevolent 911 caller need do is assert a traffic violation, and the
targeted car will be stopped, forcibly if necessary, by the police. If the
driver turns out not to be drunk (which will almost always be the case),
the caller need fear no consequences, even if 911 knows his identity.
After all, he never alleged drunkenness, but merely called in a traffic
violation—and on that point his word is as good as his victim’s. 76

Furthermore, the majority’s holding was predicated on the
unsupported assumption that the driver was engaged in criminal activity:
All that has been said up to now assumes that the anonymous caller
made, at least in effect, an accusation of drunken driving. But in fact
she did not. She said that the petitioner’s truck “[r]an [me] off the
roadway.” That neither asserts that the driver was drunk nor even
raises the likelihood that the driver was drunk. The most it conveys is
that the truck did some apparently nontypical thing that forced the
tipster off the roadway, whether partly or fully, temporarily or
permanently. Who really knows what (if anything) happened? The
truck might have swerved to avoid an animal, a pothole, or a
jaywalking pedestrian. 77

Simply put, “in order to stop the petitioners the officers here not
only had to assume without basis the accuracy of the anonymous
accusation but also had to posit an unlikely reason (drunkenness) for the
accused behavior.” 78 For these reasons, Justice Scalia concluded that,
although “[d]runken driving is a serious matter . . . so is the loss of our
freedom to come and go as we please without police interference.”79
Unfortunately, “[a]fter today’s opinion all of us on the road, and not just
drug dealers, are at risk of having our freedom of movement curtailed on
suspicion of drunkenness, based upon a phone tip, true or false, of a
single instance of careless driving.” 80
5. Riley v. California: Searches of Cell Phones
In Riley, Justice Scalia joined a unanimous Court in holding that
warrantless searches of cellular telephones were not permitted under the
search incident to arrest doctrine, which authorized limited searches of
an arrestee to protect officer safety and prevent the destruction of
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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evidence, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. 81 To begin with, the
Court held that searches of cell phones were fundamentally different
than searches of finite objects that might be found on an arrestee or in a
motor vehicle:
The term “cell phone” is itself misleading shorthand; many of these
devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity
to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras,
video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries,
albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers. 82

Furthermore, “[i]nternet search and browsing history . . . can be
found on an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an individual’s
private interests or concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms of
disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.” 83 In addition, cell
phones have immense storage capacity and thus implicate privacy
protections in a manner that searches of finite objects (e.g. plastic
containers, cigarette packs) do not:
[A] cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to
convey far more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s
private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs
labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said
of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, the
data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even
earlier. A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding
him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record of all his
communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would

81. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762-63 (1967). In Chimel, the Court created the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, which
allows warrantless searches of an arrestee’s person to protect officer safety and preserve evidence:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a
search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control”—construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.
Id. at 762-63. In the years following Chimel, the Court expanded Chimel to allow virtually all
warrantless searches incident to arrest, even if safety and evidence preservation were not implicated.
See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 454 (1981) (expanding Chimel to hold that law
enforcement officers may search the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle).
82. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
83. Id. at 2490.
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routinely be kept on a phone. 84

Indeed, the importance of protecting citizens from such intrusive,
wide-ranging, and non-particularized searches was “one of the driving
forces behind the Revolution itself,” and led the Founders to adopt the
Fourth Amendment. 85 As the majority noted, “the Fourth Amendment
was the founding generation’s response to the reviled “general warrants”
and “writs of assistance” of the colonial era, which allowed British
officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for
evidence of criminal activity.” 86
B. Justice Scalia’s Originalism in The Sixth Amendment Context
In the Sixth Amendment context, Justice Scalia has repeatedly
reached decisions that protect an accuser’s right to confront witnesses at
trial, thus benefitting criminal defendants.
1. Maryland v. Craig: Confrontation Clause in Relation to a Child
Witness
In Maryland, the Court held, per Justice O’Connor, that the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause did not prohibit a child witness in
an abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial outside the
defendant’s presence through a one-way closed circuit television. 87
Holding that the appropriateness of doing so must be made on a case-bycase basis, the Court stated that “[w]e have never held . . . that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right
to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial.”88
The majority emphasized that “[t]he central concern of the
Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a
criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of
an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact”: 89
[T]he right guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause includes not only a
“personal examination,” but also “(1) insures that the witness will give
his statements under oath—thus impressing him with the seriousness
of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty
for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

Id. at 2491.
Id. at 2494.
Id.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 836 (1990).
Id. at 844
Id. at 845.

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 3

248

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:207

‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’; [and]
(3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe the
demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury
in assessing his credibility.” 90

Justice O’Connor noted that the “combined effect of these elements
of confrontation—physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and
observation of demeanor by the trier of fact—serves the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an
accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is
the norm of Anglo–American criminal proceedings.” 91
Importantly, however, “[a]lthough face-to-face confrontation forms
‘the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause,’ we have
nevertheless recognized that it is not the sine qua non of the
confrontation right.” 92 Justice O’Connor noted that “[t]he Confrontation
Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair
opportunity to probe and expose [testimonial] infirmities [such as
forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination, thereby
calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant
weight to the witness’ testimony.” 93 Simply put, “our precedents
establish that “the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-toface confrontation at trial,” a preference that “must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”94
Consequently, although the Clause “prevents a child witness from seeing
the defendant as he or she testifies against the defendant at trial,” the
Court found that the statute in question “preserves all of the other
90. Id. at 845-846 (quoting California v. Green 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (brackets in
original)) (internal citations omitted).
91. Id. at 846.
92. Id. at 847 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. 149 at 157) (internal citation omitted).
93. Id. (brackets in original). Justice O’Connor further stated:
There is doubtless reason for saying that . . . if notes of [the witness’] testimony are
permitted to be read, [the defendant] is deprived of the advantage of that personal
presence of the witness before the jury which the law has designed for his protection.
But general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable
to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case. To say that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the
testimony of a certain witness, should go scot free simply because death has closed the
mouth of that witness, would be carrying his constitutional protection to an
unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall
not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the
accused.
Id. at 3165.
94. Id. at 849 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243
(1895)).
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elements of the confrontation right,” as a child “must be competent to
testify and must testify under oath; the defendant retains full opportunity
for contemporaneous cross-examination; and the judge, jury, and
defendant are able to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and
body) of the witness as he or she testifies.” 95 Furthermore, the state has a
“substantial interest in protecting children who are allegedly victims of
child abuse from the trauma of testifying against the alleged perpetrator
and that its statutory procedure for receiving testimony from such
witnesses is necessary to further that interest.” 96
Justice Scalia drafted a compelling dissent, stating that “[s]eldom
has this Court failed so conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee
of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion.” 97
Moreover, the “Sixth Amendment provides, with unmistakable clarity,
that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” 98 Justice Scalia
explained the implications of the Court’s holding as follows:
Because of this subordination of explicit constitutional text to currently
favored public policy, the following scene can be played out in an
American courtroom for the first time in two centuries: A father whose
young daughter has been given over to the exclusive custody of his
estranged wife, or a mother whose young son has been taken into
custody by the State’s child welfare department, is sentenced to prison
for sexual abuse on the basis of testimony by a child the parent has not
seen or spoken to for many months; and the guilty verdict is rendered
without giving the parent so much as the opportunity to sit in the
presence of the child, and to ask, personally or through counsel, ”it is
really not true, is it, that I—your father (or mother) whom you see
before you—did these terrible things?” Perhaps that is a procedure
today’s society desires; perhaps (though I doubt it) it is even a fair
procedure; but it is assuredly not a procedure permitted by the
Constitution. 99

Consequently, because “the text of the Sixth Amendment is clear,
and because the Constitution is meant to protect against, rather than
conform to, current ‘widespread belief’” that child defendants will be
traumatized when confronting their alleged perpetrators in Court, Justice

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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Scalia would have invalidated the statute.100
Justice Scalia also rejected the argument that the statute was
intended to protect the “physical and psychological well-being of child
abuse victims,” 101 stating as follows:
A child who meets the Maryland statute’s requirement of suffering
such “serious emotional distress” from confrontation that he ‘cannot
reasonably communicate’ would seem entirely safe. Why would a
prosecutor want to call a witness who cannot reasonably
communicate? And if he did, it would be the State’s own fault.
Protection of the child’s interest—as far as the Confrontation Clause is
concerned—is entirely within Maryland’s control. The State’s interest
here is in fact no more and no less than what the State’s interest always
is when it seeks to get a class of evidence admitted in criminal
proceedings: more convictions of guilty defendants. That is not an
unworthy interest, but it should not be dressed up as a humanitarian
one. 102

Justice Scalia also emphasized that “[t]he ‘special’ reasons that
exist for suspending one of the usual guarantees of reliability in the case
of children’s testimony are perhaps matched by ‘special’ reasons for
being particularly insistent upon it in the case of children’s testimony,”
as “studies show that children are substantially more vulnerable to
suggestion than adults, and often unable to separate recollected fantasy
(or suggestion) from reality.” 103 Perhaps most importantly, as Justice
Scalia noted, the Court is not free to “conduct a cost-benefit analysis of
clear and explicit constitutional guarantees, and then to adjust their
meaning to comport with our findings.” 104
2. Crawford v. Washington: Admissibility of Statements Made
Outside of Court
In Crawford, Justice Scalia drafted the majority opinion holding
that testimonial statements made outside of court are barred by the
100. Id.
101. Id. at 867.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 867-68. Justice Scalia further stated:
The Court has convincingly proved that the Maryland procedure serves a valid interest,
and gives the defendant virtually everything the Confrontation Clause guarantees
(everything, that is, except confrontation). I am persuaded, therefore, that the Maryland
procedure is virtually constitutional. Since it is not, however, actually constitutional I
would affirm the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Id. at 870.
104. Id. at 870.
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Confrontation Clause regardless of their reliability, unless the witness is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses. 105 Justice Scalia began by stating that the “Constitution’s
text does not alone resolve this case” because “[o]ne could plausibly
read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant to mean those who actually testify
at trial . . . those whose statements are offered at trial . . . or something
in-between.” 106 Turning to the historical record leading to the Clause’s
adoption, Justice Scalia noted that the “common-law tradition is one of
live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing,” although “England
at times adopted elements of the civil-law practice,” in which witness
statements “were sometimes read in court in lieu of live testimony.” 107
Importantly, however, “[t]hrough a series of statutory and judicial
reforms, English law developed a right of confrontation” that limited the
instances in which witness statements could be read in court.108 In
addition, courts “developed relatively strict rules of unavailability,
admitting examinations only if the witness was demonstrably unable to
testify in person.” 109 Furthermore, decisions in the years following the
Confrontation Clause’s adoption held that “depositions could be read
against an accused only if they were taken in his presence,” emphasizing
that “[i]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no
man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to
cross examine.” 110 In fact, “[s]ome early cases went so far as to hold that
prior testimony was inadmissible in criminal cases even if the accused
had a previous opportunity to cross-examine,” although most held that
“admissibility depended on a prior opportunity for crossexamination.” 111
Moreover, the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to enable a
defendant to cross-examine witnesses and thereby expose flaws in their
testimony:
First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed
was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. It was these
practices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like
Raleigh’s; that the Marian statutes invited; that English law’s assertion

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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of a right to confrontation was meant to prohibit; and that the
founding-era rhetoric decried. The Sixth Amendment must be
interpreted with this focus in mind. 112

In essence, the Framers rejected a “framework . . . so unpredictable
that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core
confrontation violations.” 113 Accordingly, the historical record supports
the proposition “that the Framers would not have allowed admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he
was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination.” 114
3. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Admissibility of Affidavits in
Relation to the Confrontation Clause
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court engaged in, according to Justice
Scalia’s view, “little more than the application of our holding in
Crawford v. Washington.” 115 The issue before the Court was whether
affidavits (certificates) of forensic drug analysts were testimonial under
Crawford, and thus required that the state prosecutor offer the analysts
for cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause 116 as applied to
state actors. 117
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 118 Justice Scalia then
disassembled each of the “potpourri” 119 of arguments interposed by the
government and the dissenters. The government offered that the analysts
were not “accusatory” witnesses, inasmuch as they did not “directly
accuse” the defendant and only offered evidence, the drug testing results,
that must then be coupled with other evidence. 120 Justice Scalia
dispatched that argument with his characteristically originalist retort:
“This finds no support in the text of the Sixth Amendment . . . .” 121 He
112. Id. Justice Scalia also noted that “[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not
think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’” Id. at 61.
113. Id. at 63.
114. Id. at 53-54.
115. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (citing Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
116. Id. at 305.
117. Id.
118. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
119. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 312.
120. Id. at 313.
121. Id.
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provided additional textualist support by quoting Crawford:
To be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability
be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination . . . . Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment
prescribes. 122
Then, to underscore the point, Justice Scalia brings the textual
analysis full circle: “[T]he Constitution guarantees one way [to test
testimonial reliability]: confrontation. We do not have license to suspend
the Confrontation Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available.”123
Law enforcement convenience and prosecutorial expedience do not bend
to the textual dictates of the Constitution: “The Confrontation Clause
may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is
equally true of the [constitutionally guaranteed] right to trial by jury and
the privilege against self-incrimination.” 124
Justice Scalia always began and ended his Sixth Amendment
analyses with the text of the Constitution and the original intents of the
Framers and Ratifiers. 125 His Sixth Amendment opinions were not
vehicles to favor a conservative or law enforcement and prosecution
agenda; they arose and were delimited—always—by the text of the
document. Perhaps Justice Scalia’s most telling quote in this regard
arose in Maryland v. King during oral argument. 126 In King, the issue
was whether DNA samples collected from felony arrestees (not
convicted) violated the Fourth Amendment. 127 Witness Justice Scalia’s
abject rejection of expedience and the State’s interests over the criminal
defendant’s constitutional guarantees in the following excerpt from
attorney for Maryland Katherine Winfree’s oral argument and Justice
Scalia’s mocking retort:
Attorney Winfree: Since 2009, when Maryland began to collect DNA
samples from arrestees charged with violent crimes and burglary, there
had been 225 matches, 75 prosecutions and 42 convictions, including

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
207).
127.
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Id. at 317-18 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62).
Id. at 318.
Id. at 325.
See id. at 325-38.
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that of Respondent King.
Justice Scalia: Well, that’s really good. I’ll bet you if you conducted a
lot of unreasonable searches and seizures, you’d get more convictions,
too. 128

Justice Scalia rarely wavered from his textual and originalist
viewpoint regarding criminal defendants’ rights. 129 And when he
wavered, it was only when he was writing for the majority and had to
cobble together enough justices to prevail. 130
4. Apprendi v. New Jersey: What Must be Proven Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt
In Apprendi, the Court wrestled with the extent of the facts a
prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury absent the
defendant’s waiver of jury trial. 131 The majority held that not only all
elements of the crime must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, 132 but all facts, other than prior convictions, that increase the
crime’s penalty beyond the legislatively prescribed statutory maximum
must also be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 133
Justice Scalia echoed the majority’s decision and much of its
sentiment, but in an uncharacteristically short concurrence, he explained
the unitary reasoning he would have used to resolve the case:
originalism and textualism. 134 Justice Scalia insisted there was “no
coherent alternative” to the holding that the right to trial by jury includes
a right to have a jury decide all facts that enhance the sentence beyond
the statutory maximum, and to have that decision made beyond a
reasonable doubt. 135 Justice Scalia ended his concurrence with a
broadside aimed at dissenting Justice Breyer’s judicial activism:
Justice Breyer proceeds on the erroneous and all-too-common
assumption that the Constitution means what we think it ought to
mean. It does not; it means what it says. And the guarantee that ‘[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial,
128. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 3.
129. See King, 133 S. Ct at 1989-990 (Scalia, dissenting). See also Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000).
130. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See also Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
131. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466 (2000).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 499.
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by an impartial jury,’ has no intelligible content unless it means that all
the facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally
prescribed punishment must be found by the jury. 136

Justice Scalia’s consistency in construing criminal defendants’
rights through the lenses of the text of the Constitution and the original
intents of the Framers and Ratifiers does not permit him to engage in the
sorts of ends-means pseudo-jurisprudence that some of his fellow
Justices routinely employ. Justice Scalia recognized that textualism and
originalism are not bare legal theories but are, on the contrary,
compelled by the nature of the Constitution itself as a contract between
the People and their Government. The Constitution embodies that
agreement. To the extent the Government adheres to the limits imposed
by the Constitution and its amendments, the Government retains its right
to govern. But if the Government fails to adhere to the constitutional
protections that were quid pro quo for its ratification, the Government
loses its right to govern.
Justice Scalia also recognized that the Framers incorporated within
the Constitution the procedures that must be used to amend it. The
Framers did not incorporate judicial activism or evolving senses of
decency or penumbras; rather, the Constitution provides that any
changes to the Constitution—the agreement between the People and
their Government—may only be made through the constitutional
amendment process as ratified by the People. Amendments by judicial
fiat are constitutionally invalid.
5. Ring v. Arizona: What Must be Found by a Jury
In Ring, the Court invalidated a statute that, following an
adjudication of guilt by a jury of first-degree murder, authorized the trial
court to singlehandedly determine the presence or absence of the
aggravating factors required by Arizona law to support imposition of the
death penalty. 137 The Court held that the statute violated a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions, stating that
“facts increasing punishment beyond the maximum authorized by a
guilty verdict standing alone ordinarily must be found by a jury.” 138
Thus, even though “judicial authority over the finding of aggravating
factors ‘may . . . be a better way to guarantee against the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty,’” the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
136.
137.
138.
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trial “does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of
potential factfinders.” 139
Justice Scalia issued a concurring opinion, stating that:
[T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of
punishment that the defendant receives—whether the statute calls them
elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 140

Justice Scalia emphasized that:
[T]he accelerating propensity of both state and federal legislatures to
adopt “sentencing factors” determined by judges that increase
punishment beyond what is authorized by the jury’s verdict, and my
witnessing the belief of a near majority of my colleagues that this
novel practice is perfectly OK, cause me to believe that our people’s
traditional belief in the right of trial by jury is in perilous decline. 141

This state of affairs would certainly be made worse “by the repeated
spectacle of a man’s going to his death because a judge found that an
aggravating factor existed.” 142
C. Justice Scalia’s Originalism in the Eighth Amendment Context
Justice Scalia’s Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause jurisprudence is as bound up with the original intent
of the Framers and Ratifiers as are his jurisprudence in other areas of
criminal defendants’ rights. He maintains throughout that the “cruel and
unusual punishments” forbade by the Framers through the Eighth
Amendment were those punishments that were “modes or acts of
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that
the Bill of Rights was adopted.” 143 Justice Scalia did not craft his
arguments to achieve one conservative agenda or another; rather, he
crafted his arguments in the Eighth Amendment context to honor the
Constitution, the contract between the People and their Government, in
its originally intended meaning. He rejected the “death is different”
mantra of much of the Court, which used the mantra to justify setting

139. Id. at 607.
140. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 611-12.
142. Id. at 612 (emphasis in original).
143. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (quoted in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 609 n.1 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss2/3

30

Lamparello and MacLean: Originalism and the Criminal Law

2016]

ORIGINALISM AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

257

and resetting the “cruel and unusual punishments” bar wherever those
Justices thought it morally belonged, thus ignoring the Framers’ and
Ratifiers’ original intents and the People’s adoption thereof at the time.
1. Atkins v. Virginia: What is Considered Cruel and Unusual
Atkins v. Virginia gave life to the principal enumerated in the Trop
v. Dulles 144 holding in 1958 that the contours of “cruel and unusual
punishments” were malleable and could be discerned by reading the
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.” 145 In Atkins, the issue before the Court was whether executing a
mentally retarded murder defendant was, by virtue of the mental status
of the accused, perforce a cruel and unusual punishment. 146 The theory
went that if capital punishment was to be reserved for the “worst of the
worst,” a mentally retarded defendant could never fit that category
because of the mental deficit, thus rendering execution disproportional to
the culpability and blameworthiness. 147 In Atkins, the majority, while
also rejecting the applicability of deterrence and retribution rationales of
punishment as to mentally retarded defendants, 148 rested its analysis in
large part on the trend of state legislative enactments rejecting execution
of mentally retarded defendants. 149 The majority of the Court held that
the trend reflected the “evolving standards of decency,” and thus, any
state legislative enactment in opposition to that trend and allowing
execution of mentally retarded defendants was cruel, unusual, and
unconstitutional. 150
Justice Scalia found that reasoning to evidence only the majority’s
activism, ends-over-means reasoning, and hubris: “Today’s decision is
the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-is-different jurisprudence
[and] find[s] no support in the text or history of the Eighth Amendment .
. . . Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon
nothing but the personal views of its Members.” 151 Justice Scalia found
the majority’s decision and reasoning much more social engineering
than the constitutional jurisprudence it should have been. Lest his
position be left less than clear, Justice Scalia then labeled the majority’s
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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Id. at 101; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-312 (2002).
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Id. at 317-21.
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Id. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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reasoning as based on “embarrassingly feeble evidence,” 152 and a result
of “thrashing about for evidence,” 153 but saved “the Prize for the Court’s
Most Feeble Effort to fabricate” 154 label to affix to the majority’s use of
professional and religious groups, the “world community,” and opinion
polls. 155
Providing a history lesson, Justice Scalia explained that at the time
of ratification, only “severely or profoundly mentally retarded” were
relieved of criminal punishments for their crimes. 156 He noted that
mentally retarded persons with less severe deficits were eligible for the
death penalty. 157 Justice Scalia also bemoaned what he saw as the
arrogance of the majority, which supplanted the People’s conception of
cruel and unusual punishments with its own. 158 The majority admitted
that it had done just that: “[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the
end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.” 159 A
bemused but not amused Justice Scalia found that the majority, in
applying that reasoning and in executing that power grab, must
“presumably” feel that they are “really good lawyers . . . . The arrogance
of this assumption of power takes one’s breath away.” 160
In his Atkins dissent, as with his Fourth and Sixth Amendment
position, Justice Scalia focused steadfastly on one overarching principle:
the Government has only those powers the People provided to it within
the Constitution, and those powers and their limits cannot be changed
without the consent of the People; judicial fiat is not constitutional
amendment. 161
2. Roper v. Simmons: Cruel and Unusual Punishment—The Death
Penalty for Defendants Under the Age of Eighteen
In Roper v. Simmons, a majority of the Court, speaking through
Justice Anthony Kenney, held that execution of a murder defendant who
152. Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (italics in original) (explaining that “severely or
profoundly mentally retarded” persons “generally had an IQ of 25 or below”).
157. Id. at 351-54.
158. Id. at 337.
159. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)) (quoting Atkins, 536
U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
160. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 339-40, 348-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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was under eighteen years of age at the time of the incident was
unconstitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment. 162 The majority
continued its Atkins strategy in replacing constitutional precepts with the
Justices’ preferences. 163 As in Atkins, the Court in Simmons tallied state
legislative enactments regarding execution of juvenile murderers, and
found not a majority or even a strong trend, but found that at least there
was a “consistent direction of change.” 164
Justice Scalia predictably bridled at the majority’s hubris in
expressly overruling the contrary decision decided just fifteen years
earlier in Stanford v. Kentucky, 165 and cited Founding Father Alexander
Hamilton in support:
In urging approval of a constitution that gave life-tenured judges the
power to nullify laws enacted by the people’s representatives,
Alexander Hamilton assured the citizens of New York that there was
little risk in this . . . . But Hamilton had in mind a traditional judiciary,
“bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.”
Bound down, indeed. What a mockery today’s opinion makes of
Hamilton’s expectations, announcing the Court’s conclusion that the
meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years – not,
mind you, that this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that
the Constitution has changed . . . . Worse still, the [majority of the]
Court says in so many words that what our people’s laws say about the
issue does not, in the last analysis, matter: “[I]n the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment . . . . The Court thus
proclaims itself the sole arbiter of our Nation’s moral standards.” 166

True to form, Justice Scalia harkens not to conservative or any
other political or moral agendas, but to the text of the Constitution and
the intents of the Framers and Ratifiers. The majority’s self-absorbed
strategy, wrenching these decisions away from the People, violates the
spirit and the text of the Constitution. Justice Scalia saw that and was not
shy about pointing it out: “[A]ll the Court has done today, to borrow
from another context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out
its friends.” 167
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 533, 566-67.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 361 (1989).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 607-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE
FEDERALIST, NO. 78, at 465 C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).
167. Id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

33

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 3

260

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:207

3. Montgomery v. Louisiana: Cruel and Unusual Punishment—
Life Without Parole for Those Under the Age of Eighteen
In Miller v. Alabama, a majority of the Court held that mandatory
life without parole (“LWOP”) sentences, as applied to offenders who
were juveniles on the date of their offenses, were unconstitutional in
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments
clause. 168 In Miller, Justice Scalia did not author a separate dissenting
opinion, but joined in the separate dissents of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Alito. 169
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, after the appellant had spent forty-six
years in prison on a LWOP sentence for a crime he had committed when
he was seventeen years old, the majority held that the Miller decision
was retroactive on state collateral review, because the Miller case
created a new “substantive rule of constitutional law.” 170 Query how the
Court has the power to enact a “new substantive constitutional rule”
without any amendment process whatever – but, we digress.
After referring to the majority’s holding and reasoning as a
“nothing short of astonishing,” 171 “sleight of hand,” 172 Justice Scalia
showed the rest of his cards: “This whole exercise [embodied in the
majority’s holding, reasoning, and remedy], this whole distortion of
Miller, is just a devious way of eliminating life without parole for
juvenile offenders.” 173 Indeed, “[t]his Court has no jurisdiction to decide
this case, and the decision it arrives at is wrong. I respectfully
dissent.” 174
Justice Scalia’s death penalty jurisprudence was not heavy-handed,
prosecution-favoring, or conservative; instead, it was driven by a
steadfast, textual, and historical application of the Eighth Amendment—
as drafted and ratified. Justice Scalia saw the majority’s repeated
incursions into State’s rights and legislative power and the majority’s
recurrent rulings that ignored the People’s wishes and the Constitution’s
requirements as unconstitutional and anti-democratic. Particularly given
the one-way ratchet 175 that results when the Court, through its majority,
168. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457-58 (2012).
169. Id. at. 2477-90.
170. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736-37 (2016).
171. Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 740 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). “[W]here the
punishment is in itself permissible, ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a temporary
consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a permanent constitutional maximum, disabling
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declares an entire category of offenders exempt from capital punishment,
the Court’s constitutional amendment-by-opinion “jurisprudence” is
constitutional redesign without the People’s consent and ratification.

IV. JUSTICE SCALIA’S ENDURING LEGACY
If you’re going to be a good and faithful judge, you have to resign
yourself to the fact that you’re not always going to like the conclusions
you reach. If you like them all the time, you’re probably doing something
wrong. 176
Justice Scalia’s decisions in the above cases undermine the
argument that his decisions are based on his conservative values. This is
not to say that Justice Scalia’s decisions have never aligned with his
policy positions, as his opinions in the death penalty context illustrate. It
is to say, however, that the outcomes Justice Scalia reaches are based on
his interpretive philosophy, not his ideological disposition. Although
some may argue that Justice Scalia relies on originalism precisely
because it allows him to reach politically-motivated outcomes, his
decisions in cases such as those above undercut that proposition. If
Justice Scalia were primarily outcome-driven, one would not expect him
to reach decisions that, in the Fourth Amendment context, safeguard
arrestees’ privacy rights and curtail law enforcement’s investigatory
powers, and in the Sixth Amendment context ensure fairer procedures
for criminal defendants at trial. Furthermore, when interpreting these and
other constitutional provisions, Justice Scalia relied almost exclusively
on the text, purpose, and historical record, not on judicially-created
“penumbras” or “rights” that the Court, in cases such as Planned
Parenthood, had invented out of thin air or expanded to alarming
proportions. In so doing, Justice Scalia embraced a limited view of the
Court’s Article III reviewing power, and reached outcomes that were
entirely at odds with his subjective values. In fact, if any doubt remains
regarding the motives underlying Justice Scalia’s decision-making, one
only need to recall Texas v. Johnson, in which Justice Scalia joined the
majority opinion of Justice William Brennan that invalidated a law
banning the burning of the American Flag. 177 In that opinion, Justice
the States from giving effect to altered beliefs and responding to changed social conditions.’” Id.
(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991) (Scalia, J., writing for the majority)).
176. Spiering, supra note 17.
177. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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Brennan stated as follows:
The way to preserve the flag’s special role is not to punish those who
feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are
wrong . . . . And, precisely because it is our flag that is involved, one’s
response to the flag burner may exploit the uniquely persuasive power
of the flag itself. We can imagine no more appropriate response to
burning a flag than waving one’s own, no better way to counter a flag
burner’s message than by saluting the flag that burns, no surer means
of preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by—as one
witness here did—according its remains a respectful burial. We do not
consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we
dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents. 178

Years later, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the decision was
contrary to his personal beliefs, but commanded by the language of
purposes of First Amendment, stating “[i]f it were up to me, I would put
in jail every sandal-wearing, scruffy-bearded weirdo who burns the
American flag. But I am not king.” 179 Likewise, in Employment Division
v. Smith, one would not have expected Justice Scalia, a devout Roman
Catholic, to hold that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
did not permit religious organizations to refuse to comply with generally
applicable laws, even if such law incidentally burdened an
organization’s religious beliefs. 180 Yet, that is precisely what Justice
Scalia did. Drafting the opinion on behalf of the majority, Scalia stated
as follows:
We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a
century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.
“Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general
law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The
mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant
concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the
discharge of political responsibilities (footnote omitted).” We first had
occasion to assert that principle in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878) where we rejected the claim that criminal laws against

178. Id. at 419-20.
179. Scott Bomboy, Justice Scalia Rails Again About Flag-Burning ‘Weirdos’, Constitution
Center (Nov. 12, 2015), available at: http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/11/justice-antoninscalia-rails-again-about-flag-burning-weirdoes/
180. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion
commanded the practice. “Laws,” we said, “are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices . . . . Can a man
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself.” 181

Given that Justice Scalia reached such outcomes despite his
personal values, why would anyone suspect that he based other decisions
primarily on ideological grounds? It simply does not make sense. What
does make sense, however, is the proposition that the Court’s liberalleaning Justices often decide cases based, at least in part, on their policy
predilections. For example, in every case involving abortion, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has voted to invalidate state restrictions imposing
limitations on or restricting access to abortion services, even though the
abortion right was based on an outright manipulation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s text. 182 Likewise, in every case involving the death
penalty, former Justice William Brennan voted to invalidate statutes
authorizing the death penalty in every case, even though the death
penalty, at least in theory and regardless of one’s views as a policy
matter, is unquestionably constitutional. 183 Similarly, Justice Kennedy
has relied on the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate laws outlawing
sodomy and banning same-sex marriage based on the notion of liberty
“in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions,” despite conceding that
“a literal reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the
procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty.” 184 Well,
the Fourteenth Amendment compels, not merely suggests, that result.
This is not to say that the outcomes in Roe, Lawrence, and Obergefell
were not desirable. It is to say that the Court had no authority to reach
those outcomes.

181. Id. at 878-79.
182. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
169-91 (2007).
183. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1987)
(stating that “adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual
punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the decision
below insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case”); see also U.S. Const.,
amend. XIV (because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the state from depriving citizens of “life,
liberty or property without due process of law,” the Founders implicitly viewed the death penalty as
constitutional) (emphasis added).
184. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 at 846 (1992).
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Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s decisions reflect an approach to
constitutional interpretation that embraces humility and respect for the
Constitution and the rule of law. To begin with, from his opinions it is
not difficult to discern that Justice Scalia believed that a judge’s power is
inherently limited in a democratic society. Scalia did not believe that
nine unelected, life-tenured judges should possess the authority to create
unenumerated “rights” (e.g., abortion, assisted suicide) that no words in
the Constitution could support or that, by virtue of the Constitution’s
silence on a particular issue, were left to the people to decide through the
democratic process. In Obergefell, Justice Scalia stated as follows:
It is not of special importance to me what the law says about marriage.
It is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me.
Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million
Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the
Supreme Court. The opinion in these cases is the furthest extension in
fact—and the furthest extension one can even imagine—of the Court’s
claimed power to create “liberties” that the Constitution and its
Amendments neglect to mention. This practice of constitutional
revision by an unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it
is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most
important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and
won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves. 185

Justice Scalia did not mince words, declaring that the majority’s
opinion “is a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, superlegislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of
government.” 186 For Justice Scalia, the Court abuses its power when it
essentially re-writes through case law what the Framers sought to
achieve through the amendment process. This type of decision-making
also ignored the fact that power belongs to the people, and the concept of
de-centralization enables that power to flow from the bottom-up, not the
top down. Decisions such as Obergefell replaced de-centralization with
centralization, and substituted the normative judgments of hundreds of
millions of people with the policy preferences of a handful of
unaccountable jurists. How’s that for a democracy?
Additionally, Justice Scalia revered the Constitution and the rule of
law. The Constitution’s text, in Scalia’s view, served just as much to
limit the Court’s power as it did to authorize judicial review. The
governance structure that the Founders envisioned—a democratic
185.
186.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627-28 (2015).
Id. at 2629 (emphasis in original).
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republic—did not enable judges to right every wrong, fashion a remedy
for every perceived injury, or engage in legal jujitsu to achieve outcomes
that were predicated on little more than subjective values. Rather, the
Constitution—through both structural and individual rights provisions—
delineated the contours of the Judiciary’s reviewing power, and that
power was limited by what the words said—and what they didn’t say.
As Justice Scalia once said, “[w]ords have meaning. And their meaning
doesn’t change.” 187 And there is no such thing as a moderate or middleground approach to interpreting the text, which is something that judicial
pragmatists would like people to believe. As Justice Scalia stated,
“[w]hat is a moderate interpretation of the text? Halfway between what
it really means and what you’d like it to mean?” 188
In the final analysis, there is one proposition that citizens of all
political persuasions should support: the Court does not have the
authority to manipulate or ignore the text, and when the Constitution is
silent on an issue, the Court’s obligation is to leave such an issue to the
democratic and political process. In the same way, the doctrine of stare
decisis exists to promote respect for precedent, promote certainty and
predictability in the law, and constrain future members of the Court from
simply overturning precedent because they disagreed with the outcome.
The law—and the Court itself—is bigger than the policy predilections of
a majority because the Founders envisioned a country of laws, not men.
When constitutional interpretation is approached with these principles in
mind, power flows all the way down to the people, democracy trumps
oligarchy, and the will of the people trumps the will of the powerful.
V. CONCLUSION
Toward the end of the opera Scalia/Ginsburg, tenor Scalia and
soprano Ginsburg sing a duet: “We are different, we are one,” different
in our interpretation of written texts, one in our reverence for the
Constitution and the institution we serve. From our years together at the
D.C. Circuit, we were best buddies. We disagreed now and then, but
when I wrote for the Court and received a Scalia dissent, the opinion
ultimately released was notably better than my initial circulation. Justice
Scalia nailed all the weak spots—the “applesauce” and “argle
bargle”—and gave me just what I needed to strengthen the majority
187. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, New York Magazine (Oct. 6, 2013),
available at: http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/.
188. Clare Booth, Irreplaceable Justice Antonin Scalia (Feb. 17, 2016), available at:
https://cblpi.org/irreplaceable-justice-antonin-scalia/.
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opinion. He was a jurist of captivating brilliance and wit, with a rare
talent to make even the most sober judge laugh. The press referred to his
“energetic fervor,” “astringent intellect,” “peppery prose,” “acumen,”
and “affability,” all apt descriptions. He was eminently quotable, his
pungent opinions so clearly stated that his words never slipped from the
reader’s grasp.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
***
Justice Scalia was not perfect—no one is—but he was not a
dishonest jurist. As one commentator explains:
If Scalia was a champion of those rights [for criminal defendants,
arrestees], he was an accidental champion, a jurist with a deeper
objective—namely, fidelity to what he dubbed the “original meaning”
reflected in the text of the Constitution—that happened to intersect
with the interests of the accused at some points in the constellation of
criminal law and procedure. 189

Indeed, Justice Scalia is “more easily remembered not as a champion of
the little guy, the voiceless, and the downtrodden, but rather, as Texas
Gov. Greg Abbott said, an ‘unwavering defender of the written
Constitution.’” 190
Justice Scalia’s frustration with the Court was certainly evident at
times during his tenure, and understandably so. In United States v.
Windsor, Scalia lamented as follows:
We might have covered ourselves with honor today, by promising all
sides of this debate that it was theirs to settle and that we would respect
their resolution. We might have let the People decide. But that the
majority will not do. Some will rejoice in today’s decision, and some
will despair at it; that is the nature of a controversy that matters so
much to so many. But the Court has cheated both sides, robbing the
winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes
from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better. 191

The above passage captures the essence of Justice Scalia’s
philosophy, and the enduring legacy that will carry forward for many

189. Robert J. Smith, Antonin Scalia’s Other Legacy, Slate, available at:
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/antonin_scalia_was_often_
a_friend_of_criminal_defendants.html (brackets added).
190. Id.
191. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2711 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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years after his death. At the end of the day, Justice Scalia, whether
through well-reasoned decisions, blistering dissents, or witty comments
at oral argument, spoke a truth that transcends time: “[m]ore important
than your obligation to follow your conscience, or at least prior to it, is
your obligation to form your conscience correctly.” 192 Most importantly,
“[h]ave the courage to have your wisdom regarded as stupidity . . . and
have the courage to suffer the contempt of the sophisticated world.” 193
You will be missed, Justice Scalia. You left the Court—and the law—
better than it was before you arrived.

192. Spiering,
supra
note
17,
available
at:
http://www.breitbart.com/biggovernment/2016/02/13/supereme-court-justice-antonin-scalias-greatest-quotes/.
193. Ken McIntyre, The Wit and Wisdom of Scalia: Nine Zingers, Newsweek (Feb. 14, 2016),
available at: http://www.newsweek.com/wit-wisdom-antonin-scalia-426548.
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